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ABSTRACT
Along with the introduction of private sector management tools, public servants are
expected to act more entrepreneurially—as public managers. However, research lacks
quantitative evidence on what drives entrepreneurial orientation (EO) in this context. Our
article examines the antecedents of department-level EO in public sector organizations. By
integrating different research streams into one study, we combine partly opposing
discourses. This deductive study develops and empirically tests hypotheses on antecedents
identified from private sector corporate entrepreneurship literature and from the current
debate on new public management and public value management. It uses data from 250
middle managers of Germany’s Federal Labor Agency to do so. Contrary to expectations, the
influence of management support, work discretion, and resources is only limited.
Furthermore, a focus on key performance indicators and goal ambiguity does not seem
to impede EO. Instead, a multitude of expectations, middle managers’ localism, and position
tenure have the greatest impact on department-level EO. As a result, this study provides
insights into the strong role of antecedents outside of administration. The article concludes
with a discussion of implications for both theory and practice.
INTRODUCTION
The notion of entrepreneurship poses speciﬁc challenges for public administration. In areas
of discretion and leeway, any organizational context clearly requires nonroutine or creative
behavior. However, as with public organizations, we know little about the actual antece-
dents of entrepreneurship, that is, what makes public administration innovative, proactive,
and sometimes even risk taking (Currie et al. 2008; Morris and Jones 1999). Despite the
basic idea’s prominence, empirical evidence has been lacking.
Entrepreneurship within existing organizations, often referred to as corporate entre-
preneurship, has been studied extensively within the private sector (Covin and Slevin 1991;
Guth and Ginsberg 1990;Miller 1983). Consensus on both the antecedents and outcomes of
corporate entrepreneurship has emerged (Zahra, Jennings, and Kuratko 1999; Rauch et al.
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2009). Despite the idea that organizational determinants may not outweigh general human
tendencies with regard to risk taking and innovation, the blind transfer of concepts between
the private and public sectors appears inappropriate given the substantial differences in
their purpose and mission (Pettigrew, Ferlie, and McKee 1992, 13; Rainey 2009, 60–4).
In the public sector, where private sector management principles have been introduced
over the past decades under the doctrine of new public management (NPM) (for an over-
view, see Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Hood 1991), entrepreneurship is called for as a means
to improve performance (e.g., Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Bellone and Goerl 1992).
Because NPM primarily focuses on service delivery, it restricts the notion of entrepreneur-
ship to the managerial part of implementing any given policy (O’Flynn 2007; Stoker 2006).
In fact, NPM comes close to what is called ‘‘managerialism’’ (see Terry 1998). Critics of
entrepreneurship in the public sector even point to potential threats to democratic gover-
nance and note the detrimental effects of rule breaking, competition, and self-interested
managers (deLeon and Denhardt 2000; Du Gay 2000; Rhodes and Wanna 2007; Terry
1998).
The creation of the public value (PV) concept, as proposed by Moore (1995), has been
a prominent attempt to reconcile the entrepreneurial impetus of NPM with an appreciation
of a public organization’s broader normative functions in society. Moore ‘‘equates man-
agerial success in the public sector with initiating and reshaping public sector enterprises in
ways that increase their value to the public in both the short and the long run’’ (1995, 10).
The notion of value creation for the public provides a much broader perspective than the
NPM perspective as it includes managerial efﬁciency concerns and explicitly considers the
multitude of values affected, created, or destroyed by an administration. Value creation
frames public entrepreneurship as a means of increasing its value to the public (Meynhardt
2009). Such PV creation—in the tradition of Waldo’s notion of a value-laden administra-
tion (1948/2007)—not only includes a spectrum of instrumental-utilitarian aspects, such
as spending tax money efﬁciently and solving social problems, but also normative aspects
of moral and political values beyond ﬁnancial or economic value (Meynhardt and
Bartholomes 2011).
A PV creation perspective explicitly relates entrepreneurship to the complexity of
societal challenges and the fuzzy boundaries between politics and administration. Typi-
cally, the legal mandate determines the PV to be created. However, it requires not only
efﬁcient management of the immediate tasks at hand but a proactive approach to note
the broader consequences of social problems and to act according to set rules. Public value
management (PVM) involves entrepreneurial behaviors to spot new opportunities, facil-
itate co-production with citizens and other institutions, and implement ideas to better fulﬁll
the legal mandate.
It is this highly political setting of balancing policy making and execution in a given
state environment—along with greater goal ambiguity, less decision-making autonomy for
managers, and risk/reward trade-offs—that draws the distinction between public sector and
private sector entrepreneurship (Bernier and Hafsi 2007, 490; Currie et al. 2008, 990;
Morris and Jones 1999, 77–8). Entrepreneurship always involves risk and uncertainty,
although a public organization has inherent speciﬁcs as it is subject to public law and
requires legitimacy, which is created through a political process.
In the private sector context, a set of organizational antecedents of corporate entre-
preneurship has been established for middle managers (Hornsby, Kuratko, and Zahra 2002;
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Kuratko et al. 2005). The perception of these antecedents (Marginson 2002) inﬂuences the
extent to which middle managers behave entrepreneurially (Hornsby et al. 2009). In the
public sector, middle managers are identiﬁed as the most entrepreneurial people (Morris
and Jones 1999, 83), the largest group of initiators (Borins 2000, 500), and the main source
of creativity in entrepreneurship (Bernier and Hafsi 2007, 494). Such a positive view of
middle managers’ contributions cannot, however, be taken for granted. Researchers have
argued that this management level could also be seen as a major barrier to change and
strategic renewal (Balogun 2003; Guth andMacMillan 1986). Obviously, at times, the zeit-
geist in management doctrines fosters a rather positive image and at other times a rather
negative image of this management layer (Currie and Procter 2005; Wooldridge, Schmid,
and Floyd 2008). Either way, middle managers may be regarded as the eye of the needle
through which ideas need to pass if they are to be realized.
Despite the increased importance of entrepreneurship in the public sector, there is
little empirical research on the topic. Even fewer studies have examined antecedents
(e.g., Kearney, Hisrich, and Roche 2008; Teske and Schneider 1994), and middle
managers have only recently become the focus of some (qualitative) research (Currie
and Procter 2005; Meynhardt and Metelmann 2009).
In the light of NPM and PVM, and the importance of the middle manager, the
following research question is of particular interest: Which antecedents explain the
department-level entrepreneurial orientation of middle managers in the public sector? This
article seeks to identify such antecedents, develop hypotheses, and provide empirical
evidence for them. Our central argument is that—in addition to antecedents from private
sector corporate entrepreneurship research—concepts discussed in NPM and PVM
literature affect department-level EO in the public sector. Speciﬁcally, we include key
performance indicator (KPI) focus and goal ambiguity—derived from the NPM literature—
as well as a multitude of expectations and managers’ localism—derived from the PVM lit-
erature.
We used data collected from multiple sources and levels of one of Europe’s largest
administrations, Germany’s Federal Labor Agency, which recently deﬁned increased
entrepreneurial orientation (EO) as one of its primary reform goals (Meynhardt and
Metelmann 2009, 278–80). Our ﬁndings contribute to a discussion in which it is sometimes
asserted that quantifying public sector goals negatively affects organizational outcomes
(Bevan and Hood 2006; Christiensen et al. 2007; Meynhardt and Metelmann 2009,
296–8; to some extent, also Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). Our ﬁndings also support
PVM scholars who argue for more networked governance, that is, governance that engages
with different actors in the speciﬁc community (Kelly, Mulgan, and Muers 2002; Stoker
2006). In addition, corporate entrepreneurship research may beneﬁt from validating
established antecedents in a different context. In addition to implications for theory,
speciﬁc indications for management will be outlined.
However, our ﬁndings’ most interesting contribution is that they shift the attention
from the more normative aspects of NPM and PVM to relating public sector entrepreneur-
ship to the broader discourse on what drives EO in public organizations. Putting our
quantitative study into a broader context, we follow Kelman, who called for public admin-
istration/public management to be closer connected ‘‘to the broader world of mainstream
organization theory, which can help enrich our understanding of the public sector problems
we study’’ (2005, 967).
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BACKGROUND
Entrepreneurship has been studied from a variety of perspectives by many scholars. As
a result, certain concepts and terms used in entrepreneurship research are partly contradic-
tory or overlap (Sharma and Chrisman 1999, 11). In this article, corporate entrepreneur-
ship, as ‘‘the process whereby an individual or a group of individuals, in association with an
existing organization, create a new organization or instigate renewal or innovation within
that organization’’ (ibid, 18) will be used to refer to both the process and the literature on
entrepreneurship within existing organizations. Public entrepreneurship will be used spe-
ciﬁcally for the public sector (Currie et al. 2008, 989). Entrepreneurial behavior will refer
to how corporate entrepreneurship is practiced at an individual level (Kuratko et al. 2005,
699–700), whereas EO (Lumpkin and Dess 1996) will refer to an organization’s or depart-
ment’s level of entrepreneurship, which will be characterized by innovativeness, risk
taking, and proactiveness (Covin and Slevin 1991; Currie et al. 2008, 989; Miller 1983).
Both research and practice are interested in corporate entrepreneurship, which has
been demonstrated to positively affect private sector organizations’ performance (Covin
and Slevin 1989; Lumpkin and Dess 1996; Rauch et al. 2009 for EO; Zahra 1991). Ante-
cedents of corporate entrepreneurship have been researched intensively, and consensus has
been reached on important variables (Zahra, Jennings, and Kuratko 1999). Empirically
tested organizational antecedents of middle managers’ entrepreneurial behavior include
management support, work discretion, rewards/reinforcement, time availability, and
organizational boundaries (Kuratko et al. 2005). More speciﬁcally, the perception of these
antecedents (Marginson 2002) is relevant, that is, middle managers will act more
entrepreneurially if they perceive top management as being supportive of such behavior
(Hornsby et al. 2009). To a certain extent, the same holds true for environmental antece-
dents, such as perceived dynamism, technological opportunities, industry growth, and
demand for new products (Antoncic 2007, 311).
Recent developments in public sector management have increased the need to under-
stand how EO can be achieved in public administrations. Since the late 1970s, traditional
public management (TPM), based onWeberian bureaucracy, has faced increasing criticism
for inﬂexible structures, indifferent and bureaucratic staff, and overall unsatisfying perfor-
mance (Schedler and Proeller 2006, 17–8; Hood 1991, 7). In response, the NPM
approach—which seeks to improve management and processes by applying more private
sector management techniques and market elements—was introduced (Schedler and
Proeller 2006, 57; Hood 1991, 3–4). This shift also changed the public manager’s role.
It was thus assumed that the public manager’s role would become similar to that of the
private manager in that they were both to decide how best to achieve an outcome with
a given amount of resources.
The introduction of NPM has realized some beneﬁts, such as improved consumer
orientation, clariﬁcation of objectives and responsibilities, and the use of executive agendas
(Kelly, Mulgan, and Muers 2002, 9; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004, 103–42). Despite these
beneﬁts, NPM reforms are also associated with negative developments in public manage-
ment. In summarizing them, Kelly, Mulgan, and Muers (2002, 9) criticize NPM’s allegedly
narrow focus on measurable performance, which ignores what matters to the public, among
others. In the view of PV advocates, this situation set the stage for reconsidering the public
manager’s role. Moore’s bookCreating public value: Strategic management in government
(1995)—a plea for entrepreneurial management in the public sector with the ultimate goal
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of creating PV—initiated a nascent research ﬁeld and management approach: public value
management (PVM).
An elaborated comparison between TPM, NPM, and PVM is provided by Stoker
(2006, 44) as well as Kelly, Mulgan, and Muers (2002, 10). The three approaches to public
administration are very distinct in relation to public entrepreneurship. In Weberian-style
TPM, there is little concern for entrepreneurship at the management level. In stressing one
aspect of Weber’s perspective, bureaucrats are expected to fulﬁll centrally (politically) set
objectives and follow strict rules. Public participation is minimized; instead, managers
must focus on internal procedures. NPM explicitly calls for entrepreneurship. The
manager’s role is more proactive: managers help determine targets, primarily by deciding
on the appropriate means to achieve them. Entrepreneurship seeks to ensure performance in
terms of efﬁciency and citizen/customer satisfaction. From an NPM perspective, a public
servant should become like a private manager: ‘‘[A] good new public management system
gives managers the freedom to manage. Politicians exist to set goals but then get out of the
way’’ (Stoker 2006, 46).
Similarly to NPM, PVM calls for ‘‘entrepreneurial thinking’’ and decentralization.
However, PVM requires a different type of manager. Instead of focusing purely on measur-
able performance, PVM expects managers to also maximize PV beyond efﬁciency goals
(Moore 1995). Since this involves active engagement with all stakeholders and, above all,
a sense for challenges and opportunities, the idea of entrepreneurship is explicitly directed
to the notion of dialogue, facilitation, and co-production. This is not antithetical to NPM but
is an additional role expectation at the heart of public entrepreneurship. Whereas NPM
managers primarily focus on managing given tasks, PVM managers must leverage net-
works, access resources outside their domain (Stoker 2006, 41), and develop ideas with
relevant actors across institutional boundaries (Meynhardt 2008, 459). The manager’s task
thus also includes managing the network and considering public opinion through dialogue.
This is not the main focus on NPM’s agenda.
In contrasting the two views of public entrepreneurship (a more narrow one in NPM
and a broader one in PVM), it becomes clear that stimulating entrepreneurial activity is not
per se equivalent to creating PV. In some instances, NPM-oriented entrepreneurial behavior
might even destroy PV, for example, via a short-term focus on performance measurement
or a one-sided trade-off between ﬁscal stress and social stress. Although NPM and PVM
both require entrepreneurship, they focus on different aspects.
As already mentioned, despite its increasing importance, public entrepreneurship has
been the subject of little research. Research on heroic managers at the top of organizations
(Lewis 1980; Osborne and Gaebler 1992) has long dominated the debate, whereas research
on other actors is only slowly developing. Yet, various studies have identiﬁed public middle
managers—the managers between frontline managers and top managers (Rainey 1983,
215)—as crucial to public entrepreneurship. In the private sector, middle managers
communicate new initiatives to top management (Burgelman 1983a, 1983b), promote
autonomous and informal entrepreneurship (Kanter 1985, 1989), and generally shape
an organization’s strategy by championing proposals and programs, by synthesizing infor-
mation, by facilitating adaptability, and by implementing deliberate strategy (Floyd
and Lane 2000; Floyd and Wooldridge 1997). In the public sector, Morris and Jones
(1999, 83) ﬁnd that middle management represents the most entrepreneurial management
sector; Borins (2000, 500) identiﬁes middle managers as by far the largest group of
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initiators; Bernier and Hafsi (2007, 494) describe them as the main source of creativity in
public entrepreneurship; and Burgelman (1985, 595–6) asserts that, like corporate entrepre-
neurs, public entrepreneurs can be found ‘‘deep in the organization’’ rather than at the top.
Most studies on public entrepreneurship apply either a purely conceptual approach
(Bellone and Goerl 1992; Kearney, Hisrich, and Roche 2008; Ramamurti 1986) or rely
on own experience and anecdotal evidence (Bernier and Hafsi 2007; Lewis 1980; Moore
1995; Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Roberts and King 1991). Few studies apply a rigorous
approach to conducting case studies (Currie and Procter 2005; Meynhardt and Metelmann
2009; Zerbinati and Souitaris 2005). Those studies that use quantitative data either remain
descriptive (Borins 2000; Morris and Jones 1999) or completely neglect middle managers
(Kim 2007; Mack, Green, and Vedlitz 2008; Moon 1999; Schneider, Teske, and Mintrom
1995; Teske and Schneider 1994; Wood et al. 2008). Overall, there appears to be a general
lack of detailed studies and rigorous theory testing in public entrepreneurship research (this
interpretation is in line with Zerbinati and Souitaris 2005, 46; Currie et al. 2008, 988;
Morris and Jones 1999, 87). Prior studies provide important indications, which are used
to develop an integrated model in the next section.
THEORETICAL MODEL
With the emergence of NPM and PVM, there has been an increase in the demand for en-
trepreneurial behavior and orientation in public sector organizations. New public manage-
ment relies on the explicit assumption that private sector concepts can and should be
transferred to the public sector. With regard to entrepreneurship, there are, however, chan-
ces for and limits to transfer: private sector research may provide antecedents that can be
applied independently by a sector, such as management support or resource availability. On
the other hand, a public organization is not mandated to seek proﬁts but required to fulﬁll its
politically deﬁned tasks. The ﬁnancial bottom line is just one aspect among others, such as
social cohesion, fairness, or justice. Very similar to entrepreneurship in a corporation, risk
orientation and innovation can only apply in areas with discretion and a mandate to actively
create something new—here, for example, shaping urban development, social work, and
labor market services. In public organizations where strict reliability is essential, such as
payment services and public safety, rule-based behavior is needed, not entrepreneurship. In
our study, we will incorporate and deliberately yet cautiously adapt organizational ante-
cedents from private sector research. Despite the difﬁculties involved, we seek to empir-
ically test organizational antecedents since private sector concepts may build on more
fundamental principles of human behavior that are not restricted to any sector.
Nevertheless, the discussion on NPM and PVM has shed light on additional antece-
dents that are particularly interesting in the public sector context. Figure 1 illustrates our
conceptual model. This model and the following hypotheses are based on three assump-
tions. First, for middle managers to act in a certain way, their perception of an antecedent is
more important than its actual existence (Marginson 2002). Second, this study assumes that
middle managers’ entrepreneurial behavior—a core aspect of corporate entrepreneurship
(Hornsby, Kuratko, and Zahra 2002; Hornsby et al. 2009; Kuratko et al. 2005)—has a direct
impact on their department’s EO (Pearce, Kramer, and Robbins 1997). Third, and perhaps
most importantly, EO is not detrimental to an administration’s legal mandate, that is,
through EO, value is created and not destroyed. We therefore empirically investigate
the relationship between EO and an orientation toward PV creation.
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Antecedents Derived from Private Sector Literature
With regard to the private sector, scholars (e.g., Hornsby et al. 2009; Kuratko et al. 2005)
have recently used a fairly stable set of organizational antecedents. This set is based on
work by Hornsby, Kuratko, and Zahra (2002), who have developed and tested an instru-
ment assessing organizational antecedents that inﬂuence middle managers, based on an
extensive literature review (see Hornsby, Kuratko, and Montagno 1999, 11) and a number
of empirical tests. They have identiﬁed the perceptions of management support, work
discretion, rewards/reinforcement, time availability, and organizational boundaries as
relevant (Hornsby, Kuratko, and Zahra 2002, 261). We use this structure to discuss the
impact of established organizational antecedents from private sector literature.
In this article, management support is deﬁned as the extent to which one perceives that
superior managers support, facilitate, and promote entrepreneurial behavior (adapted from
Hornsby et al. 2009, 238). This can take on a number of forms, including championing or
adopting innovative ideas, recognizing employee ideas, supporting small projects, provid-
ing expertise, and institutionalizing entrepreneurial activity within the organization’s sys-
tem and processes (Hornsby et al. 2009, 238; Hornsby, Kuratko, and Zahra 2002, 259;
Hornsby et al. 1993, 32; Kuratko et al. 2005, 703). In the public sector as much as in
the private sector, middle managers are more likely to behave entrepreneurially when they
perceive support for such behavior. In contrast, middle managers are less likely to behave
entrepreneurially when superior managers discourage innovative, proactive, and risk-
taking behavior. Therefore:
H1a: Public middle managers’ perception of management support positively relates to
their department’s EO.
In this article, work discretion is deﬁned as superior managers’ commitment to
‘‘tolerate failure, provide decision-making latitude and freedom from excessive oversight,
and to delegate authority and responsibility to middle-level managers’’ (adopted from
Figure 1
Conceptual Model Including Summary of Hypotheses
Entrepreneurial orientation
Established private sector 
• Management support (+, H1a) 
• Work discretion (+, H1b) 
• Rewards/reinforcement (+, H1c) 
• Resource availability (+, H1d) 
New public management 
• KPI focus (-, H2a) 
• Goal ambiguity (-, H2b) 
Public value management 
• Multitude of expectations (+, H3a) 
• Localism (+, H3b)
Note. Parentheses contain expected direction of effect and hypothesis number.  
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initiators; Bernier and Hafsi (2007, 494) describe them as the main source of creativity in
public entrepreneurship; and Burgelman (1985, 595–6) asserts that, like corporate entrepre-
neurs, public entrepreneurs can be found ‘‘deep in the organization’’ rather than at the top.
Most studies on public entrepreneurship apply either a purely conceptual approach
(Bellone and Goerl 1992; Kearney, Hisrich, and Roche 2008; Ramamurti 1986) or rely
on own experience and anecdotal evidence (Bernier and Hafsi 2007; Lewis 1980; Moore
1995; Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Roberts and King 1991). Few studies apply a rigorous
approach to conducting case studies (Currie and Procter 2005; Meynhardt and Metelmann
2009; Zerbinati and Souitaris 2005). Those studies that use quantitative data either remain
descriptive (Borins 2000; Morris and Jones 1999) or completely neglect middle managers
(Kim 2007; Mack, Green, and Vedlitz 2008; Moon 1999; Schneider, Teske, and Mintrom
1995; Teske and Schneider 1994; Wood et al. 2008). Overall, there appears to be a general
lack of detailed studies and rigorous theory testing in public entrepreneurship research (this
interpretation is in line with Zerbinati and Souitaris 2005, 46; Currie et al. 2008, 988;
Morris and Jones 1999, 87). Prior studies provide important indications, which are used
to develop an integrated model in the next section.
THEORETICAL MODEL
With the emergence of NPM and PVM, there has been an increase in the demand for en-
trepreneurial behavior and orientation in public sector organizations. New public manage-
ment relies on the explicit assumption that private sector concepts can and should be
transferred to the public sector. With regard to entrepreneurship, there are, however, chan-
ces for and limits to transfer: private sector research may provide antecedents that can be
applied independently by a sector, such as management support or resource availability. On
the other hand, a public organization is not mandated to seek proﬁts but required to fulﬁll its
politically deﬁned tasks. The ﬁnancial bottom line is just one aspect among others, such as
social cohesion, fairness, or justice. Very similar to entrepreneurship in a corporation, risk
orientation and innovation can only apply in areas with discretion and a mandate to actively
create something new—here, for example, shaping urban development, social work, and
labor market services. In public organizations where strict reliability is essential, such as
payment services and public safety, rule-based behavior is needed, not entrepreneurship. In
our study, we will incorporate and deliberately yet cautiously adapt organizational ante-
cedents from private sector research. Despite the difﬁculties involved, we seek to empir-
ically test organizational antecedents since private sector concepts may build on more
fundamental principles of human behavior that are not restricted to any sector.
Nevertheless, the discussion on NPM and PVM has shed light on additional antece-
dents that are particularly interesting in the public sector context. Figure 1 illustrates our
conceptual model. This model and the following hypotheses are based on three assump-
tions. First, for middle managers to act in a certain way, their perception of an antecedent is
more important than its actual existence (Marginson 2002). Second, this study assumes that
middle managers’ entrepreneurial behavior—a core aspect of corporate entrepreneurship
(Hornsby, Kuratko, and Zahra 2002; Hornsby et al. 2009; Kuratko et al. 2005)—has a direct
impact on their department’s EO (Pearce, Kramer, and Robbins 1997). Third, and perhaps
most importantly, EO is not detrimental to an administration’s legal mandate, that is,
through EO, value is created and not destroyed. We therefore empirically investigate
the relationship between EO and an orientation toward PV creation.
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Antecedents Derived from Private Sector Literature
With regard to the private sector, scholars (e.g., Hornsby et al. 2009; Kuratko et al. 2005)
have recently used a fairly stable set of organizational antecedents. This set is based on
work by Hornsby, Kuratko, and Zahra (2002), who have developed and tested an instru-
ment assessing organizational antecedents that inﬂuence middle managers, based on an
extensive literature review (see Hornsby, Kuratko, and Montagno 1999, 11) and a number
of empirical tests. They have identiﬁed the perceptions of management support, work
discretion, rewards/reinforcement, time availability, and organizational boundaries as
relevant (Hornsby, Kuratko, and Zahra 2002, 261). We use this structure to discuss the
impact of established organizational antecedents from private sector literature.
In this article, management support is deﬁned as the extent to which one perceives that
superior managers support, facilitate, and promote entrepreneurial behavior (adapted from
Hornsby et al. 2009, 238). This can take on a number of forms, including championing or
adopting innovative ideas, recognizing employee ideas, supporting small projects, provid-
ing expertise, and institutionalizing entrepreneurial activity within the organization’s sys-
tem and processes (Hornsby et al. 2009, 238; Hornsby, Kuratko, and Zahra 2002, 259;
Hornsby et al. 1993, 32; Kuratko et al. 2005, 703). In the public sector as much as in
the private sector, middle managers are more likely to behave entrepreneurially when they
perceive support for such behavior. In contrast, middle managers are less likely to behave
entrepreneurially when superior managers discourage innovative, proactive, and risk-
taking behavior. Therefore:
H1a: Public middle managers’ perception of management support positively relates to
their department’s EO.
In this article, work discretion is deﬁned as superior managers’ commitment to
‘‘tolerate failure, provide decision-making latitude and freedom from excessive oversight,
and to delegate authority and responsibility to middle-level managers’’ (adopted from
Figure 1
Conceptual Model Including Summary of Hypotheses
Entrepreneurial orientation
Established private sector 
• Management support (+, H1a) 
• Work discretion (+, H1b) 
• Rewards/reinforcement (+, H1c) 
• Resource availability (+, H1d) 
New public management 
• KPI focus (-, H2a) 
• Goal ambiguity (-, H2b) 
Public value management 
• Multitude of expectations (+, H3a) 
• Localism (+, H3b)
Note. Parentheses contain expected direction of effect and hypothesis number.  
r t i l
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 768
Kuratko et al. 2005, 704). Work discretion is provided when middle managers have the
leeway to decide on how to most effectively perform their work. Such discretion can
be achieved if middle managers are not punished or criticized for making mistakes while
being innovative (Hornsby et al. 1993, 32). In the public sector as much as in the private
sector, middle managers are more likely to behave entrepreneurially when they perceive
discretion in their work. Managers who are encouraged to decide how to achieve goals will
ﬁnd more creative ways of doing so. They are more likely to experiment and innovate when
fewer strict rules and procedures are in place. What is speciﬁc to the public sector is the
areas in which, and the extent to which, discretion is appropriate. In certain cases, centrally
determined or legally binding goals and procedures are inevitable. In many other cases,
work discretion will allow managers to behave more entrepreneurially. Therefore:
H1b: Public middle managers’ perception of work discretion positively relates to their
departments’ EO.
In this article, the term rewards/reinforcement is deﬁned as ‘‘systems that reward
based on performance, highlight signiﬁcant achievements, and encourage pursuit of chal-
lenging work’’ (Kuratko et al. 2005, 703). With respect to EO, employee perceptions of the
extent to which the organization offers reward systems that honor entrepreneurial activity
and success are crucial (Kuratko et al. 2005, 701, 709). Examples of rewards/reinforcement
include increased responsibility, monetary incentives, recognition through badges or cer-
emonies, and disseminating innovative people’s ideas (e.g., Sathe 1989, 26; Hornsby et al.
1993, 32; Kanter 1985, 55). Many of these forms are also available to the public sector (for
associated difﬁculties, see Markowski and Hall 2007, 273).
The concept of rewards/reinforcement is considered an important antecedent of EO
because entrepreneurial behavior is associated with personal risks, such as career derail-
ment in the case of failure (Kuratko et al. 2005, 701). Appropriate rewards and reinforce-
ment can motivate employees to engage in entrepreneurial behavior by offsetting such risks
(Hornsby, Kuratko, and Zahra 2002, 259; Hornsby et al. 1993, 32). In other words, if
entrepreneurial behavior is not rewarded or recognized, there is little extrinsic incentive
to engage in the risky endeavor of entrepreneurship.
A number of empirical studies in related ﬁelds indicate the importance of rewards/
recognition. Hisrich and Peters (1986) ﬁnd evidence for performance goals and appropriate
reward systems as antecedents of successful new business venture units. Morris and Jones
(1993) discover that more entrepreneurial companies reward individual performance, focus
on long-term outcomes, and explicitly encourage entrepreneurial behaviors. Wood et al.
(2008, 126) provide initial evidence of a positive correlation between the appropriate use of
rewards and corporate entrepreneurship in their study with military and civilian employees
of the US Air Force. Therefore, we hypothesize a relationship that is similar to that in the
private sector:
H1c: Public middle managers’ perception of rewards/reinforcement positively relates to
their departments’ EO.
In this article, resource availability is deﬁned as the perceived ‘‘availability of resour-
ces for innovative activities’’ (Hornsby, Kuratko, and Zahra 2002, 253) including ﬁnancial
resources, time availability, and human resources. Covin and Slevin (1991, 15) also use
such a broad deﬁnition of resources (including monetary resources, ﬁxed assets, and human
resources) as an antecedent to corporate entrepreneurship. In contrast to the concept of
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‘‘slack resources,’’ which refers to excess resources (Cyert and March 1992, 42), here, ‘‘re-
source availability’’ refers to the accessibility of resources. In the public sector as much as
in the private sector, middle managers who perceive available resources for innovative
activities are more likely to experiment and take risks (Hornsby, Kuratko, and Zahra
2002, 253). In the public sector, ﬁnancial resources will be relevant in terms of budget
ﬂexibility. The absolute budget amount is less relevant since it is determined by means
of a political process in which middle managers are not involved. With such ﬂexibility,
middle managers can quickly provide seed funding for initiatives. However, ﬁnancial
resources are not enough. Managers need time to oversee, develop, and enhance experi-
ments. In the end, sufﬁcient human resources are key—initiatives can be launched much
more easily if they receive support from motivated, innovative employees. Therefore,
a relationship similar to that in the private sector is hypothesized:
H1d: Public middle managers’ perception of resource availability positively relates to
their departments’ EO.
Antecedents Derived from New Public Management Literature
NPM reforms have increased the focus on measurable results in many organizations (Pollitt
and Bouckaert 2004, 90). The diverse effects of management control systems (MCS) are
also recognized in the public sector (Kearney, Hisrich, and Roche 2008, 303). This study
focuses on the two particularly prominent aspects of MCS: KPI focus and goal ambiguity.
In this article, KPI focus is deﬁned as the extent to which one perceives that superior
managers manage by means of KPIs. KPI focus thus describes how much focus managers
place on the quantiﬁable aspect of management by objectives (MbO) (Drucker 1993,
119–34). In the public sector, MbO at the organizational level is also referred to as gov-
ernance by targets (Bevan and Hood 2006). Excessive control (Sykes 1986, 277–8) and
formal control (Zahra 1991) can have negative effects on corporate entrepreneurship in
the private sector. However, evidence is contradictory. Barringer and Bluedorn (1999) ﬁnd
no effect of ﬁnancial control on corporate entrepreneurship; and Marginson (2002, 1026)
ﬁnds no effect of KPI use that discourages the development of initiatives and new ideas. In
the NPM context, the implementation of tools that measure output/outcome has evoked
mixed reactions. On the one hand, KPIs have helped public organizations focus and im-
prove their customer orientation. This was possible due their increased role in management,
for example, as a basis for decisions, benchmarking, and/or budgeting (Pollitt and Bouck-
aert 2004, 92). Depending on how goals are set, they can also inspire middle managers to
develop and implement their own creative, entrepreneurial ways to achieve goals (Margin-
son 2002, 1025).
On the other hand, the stronger focus on quantiﬁable measures is being criticized for
producing unintended consequences, such as neglecting important nonquantiﬁable aspects
and fostering tunnel vision (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Smith 1995). We hold that a strict
focus on only formal controls (in this case KPIs) may restrict the leeway for entrepreneurial
behavior and distract attention away from innovative action. Therefore,
H2a: Public middle managers’ perception of the extent of KPI focus negatively relates to
their departments’ EO.
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Kuratko et al. 2005, 704). Work discretion is provided when middle managers have the
leeway to decide on how to most effectively perform their work. Such discretion can
be achieved if middle managers are not punished or criticized for making mistakes while
being innovative (Hornsby et al. 1993, 32). In the public sector as much as in the private
sector, middle managers are more likely to behave entrepreneurially when they perceive
discretion in their work. Managers who are encouraged to decide how to achieve goals will
ﬁnd more creative ways of doing so. They are more likely to experiment and innovate when
fewer strict rules and procedures are in place. What is speciﬁc to the public sector is the
areas in which, and the extent to which, discretion is appropriate. In certain cases, centrally
determined or legally binding goals and procedures are inevitable. In many other cases,
work discretion will allow managers to behave more entrepreneurially. Therefore:
H1b: Public middle managers’ perception of work discretion positively relates to their
departments’ EO.
In this article, the term rewards/reinforcement is deﬁned as ‘‘systems that reward
based on performance, highlight signiﬁcant achievements, and encourage pursuit of chal-
lenging work’’ (Kuratko et al. 2005, 703). With respect to EO, employee perceptions of the
extent to which the organization offers reward systems that honor entrepreneurial activity
and success are crucial (Kuratko et al. 2005, 701, 709). Examples of rewards/reinforcement
include increased responsibility, monetary incentives, recognition through badges or cer-
emonies, and disseminating innovative people’s ideas (e.g., Sathe 1989, 26; Hornsby et al.
1993, 32; Kanter 1985, 55). Many of these forms are also available to the public sector (for
associated difﬁculties, see Markowski and Hall 2007, 273).
The concept of rewards/reinforcement is considered an important antecedent of EO
because entrepreneurial behavior is associated with personal risks, such as career derail-
ment in the case of failure (Kuratko et al. 2005, 701). Appropriate rewards and reinforce-
ment can motivate employees to engage in entrepreneurial behavior by offsetting such risks
(Hornsby, Kuratko, and Zahra 2002, 259; Hornsby et al. 1993, 32). In other words, if
entrepreneurial behavior is not rewarded or recognized, there is little extrinsic incentive
to engage in the risky endeavor of entrepreneurship.
A number of empirical studies in related ﬁelds indicate the importance of rewards/
recognition. Hisrich and Peters (1986) ﬁnd evidence for performance goals and appropriate
reward systems as antecedents of successful new business venture units. Morris and Jones
(1993) discover that more entrepreneurial companies reward individual performance, focus
on long-term outcomes, and explicitly encourage entrepreneurial behaviors. Wood et al.
(2008, 126) provide initial evidence of a positive correlation between the appropriate use of
rewards and corporate entrepreneurship in their study with military and civilian employees
of the US Air Force. Therefore, we hypothesize a relationship that is similar to that in the
private sector:
H1c: Public middle managers’ perception of rewards/reinforcement positively relates to
their departments’ EO.
In this article, resource availability is deﬁned as the perceived ‘‘availability of resour-
ces for innovative activities’’ (Hornsby, Kuratko, and Zahra 2002, 253) including ﬁnancial
resources, time availability, and human resources. Covin and Slevin (1991, 15) also use
such a broad deﬁnition of resources (including monetary resources, ﬁxed assets, and human
resources) as an antecedent to corporate entrepreneurship. In contrast to the concept of
8 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
‘‘slack resources,’’ which refers to excess resources (Cyert and March 1992, 42), here, ‘‘re-
source availability’’ refers to the accessibility of resources. In the public sector as much as
in the private sector, middle managers who perceive available resources for innovative
activities are more likely to experiment and take risks (Hornsby, Kuratko, and Zahra
2002, 253). In the public sector, ﬁnancial resources will be relevant in terms of budget
ﬂexibility. The absolute budget amount is less relevant since it is determined by means
of a political process in which middle managers are not involved. With such ﬂexibility,
middle managers can quickly provide seed funding for initiatives. However, ﬁnancial
resources are not enough. Managers need time to oversee, develop, and enhance experi-
ments. In the end, sufﬁcient human resources are key—initiatives can be launched much
more easily if they receive support from motivated, innovative employees. Therefore,
a relationship similar to that in the private sector is hypothesized:
H1d: Public middle managers’ perception of resource availability positively relates to
their departments’ EO.
Antecedents Derived from New Public Management Literature
NPM reforms have increased the focus on measurable results in many organizations (Pollitt
and Bouckaert 2004, 90). The diverse effects of management control systems (MCS) are
also recognized in the public sector (Kearney, Hisrich, and Roche 2008, 303). This study
focuses on the two particularly prominent aspects of MCS: KPI focus and goal ambiguity.
In this article, KPI focus is deﬁned as the extent to which one perceives that superior
managers manage by means of KPIs. KPI focus thus describes how much focus managers
place on the quantiﬁable aspect of management by objectives (MbO) (Drucker 1993,
119–34). In the public sector, MbO at the organizational level is also referred to as gov-
ernance by targets (Bevan and Hood 2006). Excessive control (Sykes 1986, 277–8) and
formal control (Zahra 1991) can have negative effects on corporate entrepreneurship in
the private sector. However, evidence is contradictory. Barringer and Bluedorn (1999) ﬁnd
no effect of ﬁnancial control on corporate entrepreneurship; and Marginson (2002, 1026)
ﬁnds no effect of KPI use that discourages the development of initiatives and new ideas. In
the NPM context, the implementation of tools that measure output/outcome has evoked
mixed reactions. On the one hand, KPIs have helped public organizations focus and im-
prove their customer orientation. This was possible due their increased role in management,
for example, as a basis for decisions, benchmarking, and/or budgeting (Pollitt and Bouck-
aert 2004, 92). Depending on how goals are set, they can also inspire middle managers to
develop and implement their own creative, entrepreneurial ways to achieve goals (Margin-
son 2002, 1025).
On the other hand, the stronger focus on quantiﬁable measures is being criticized for
producing unintended consequences, such as neglecting important nonquantiﬁable aspects
and fostering tunnel vision (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Smith 1995). We hold that a strict
focus on only formal controls (in this case KPIs) may restrict the leeway for entrepreneurial
behavior and distract attention away from innovative action. Therefore,
H2a: Public middle managers’ perception of the extent of KPI focus negatively relates to
their departments’ EO.
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In this article, goal ambiguity is deﬁned as the extent to which organizational goals are
perceived as ambiguous and numerous (adapted from Ramamurti 1986, 150). Speciﬁcally,
here, organizational goals refer to personally relevant objectives (versus organizational
goals). As the term suggests, goal ambiguity is the opposite of goal clarity (Pandey
and Garnett 2006, 38). Public middle managers appear particularly prone to role conﬂicts.
On the one hand, middle managers are generally said to experience particularly high levels
of role conﬂict (Floyd and Lane 2000). On the other hand, in public sector organizations,
goals are particularly vague, intangible, numerous, and conﬂicting (Rainey 2009, 149).
Consistent with these observations, Currie and Procter (2005) ﬁnd that role conﬂicts pre-
vent hospital middle managers from taking a strategic role. Meynhardt and Metelmann
(2009) ﬁnd evidence that middle managers’ role conﬂicts arise from the multidimensional
nature of the task itself and less so from the natural sandwich position between top man-
agement and frontline management. With regard to public entrepreneurship, goal ambigu-
ity’s role is unclear; although several scholars consider it beneﬁcial, others consider it an
obstacle to public entrepreneurship. Ramamurti (1986, 151), for example, identiﬁes goal
ambiguity as one of six ‘‘well-known’’ barriers to public entrepreneurship since conﬂicting
goals could paralyze managers. However, he also points out that entrepreneurialmanagers
can deal with conﬂicts and use undeﬁned areas to broaden organizational tasks. Acknowl-
edging opposing views, we hypothesize along the same lines as Floyd and Lane (2000),
Currie and Procter (2005), and Meynhardt and Metelmann (2009). Numerous, contradic-
tory, and complex organizational goals will increase middle managers’ role conﬂicts,
impeding them from taking a more strategic and entrepreneurial role. Therefore,
H2b: Public middle managers’ perception of goal ambiguity negatively relates to their
departments’ EO.
Antecedents Derived from Public Value Management Literature
The PVM approach is very different from the NPM approach. In PVM, the local environ-
ment and stakeholders are supposed to be involved in dialogues and decision making. The
manager’s role is to engage with these networks and to consider a multitude of individual
and public expectations. A new focus is also proposed with respect to the democratic pro-
cess: it is based on extended dialogue on the public dimension and public interest. Moore’s
basic idea is to mobilize different actors in a community to engage with the process of
public deliberation and social problems that cannot be solved by just one party. He, together
with Bennington, therefore draws on Dewey’s argument to ‘‘call into existence a public that
can understand and act on its own best interests’’ (Bennington and Moore 2011, 273). De-
spite this participative element of explicitly facing the ever-changing needs in the public
sphere and co-production being a basic tenet within the PV discourse, none of the constructs
has as yet been measured. Here, we focus on the multitude of expectations and manager
localism.
In this article, multitude of expectations is deﬁned as the perceived variety and di-
versity of external local actors’ expectations. Local actors, such as employers’ associations,
trade unions, local authorities, politicians, and welfare institutions, are vocal groups in so-
ciety that affect middle managers in some way. Acknowledging existing needs, sensing
potential synergies and conﬂicts may be seen as a prerequisite for effective entrepreneur-
ship. The construct multitude of expectations thus includes the perceived key stakeholders’
10 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
expectations (Currie and Procter 2005) and involvement and dialogue in networks (Stoker
2006). The more diverse the local actors’ expectations, the more creative managers will
have to be to abandon, inﬂuence, or fulﬁll these expectations. In contrast to internal
organizational goals (H2b), managers are not obliged to fulﬁll all external expectations.
Instead, a manager can and must balance or even deprioritize inappropriate expectations
and use others as an inspiration to identify opportunities not evident from within the or-
ganization. However, this constant exposure to external voices should have a positive im-
pact on EO. Therefore,
H3a: Public middle managers’ perception of a multitude of expectations positively
relates to their departments’ EO.
In this article, we deﬁne localism as middle managers’ willingness and desire to fulﬁll
the local community’s needs. Following Roof, localism is a measure of communal refer-
ence and denotes ‘‘an individual’s scale of social experience and participation’’ (1972,
3–4). At the individual level, the phenomenon will, for example, be reﬂected in a sense
of feeling at home in a given district, participation in voluntary work, or in a need for
appreciation in the local community. In contrast to Roof (1972), who conceptualizes
localism as part of the dichotomy localism versus cosmopolitanism, localism is seen
as unipolar here. In an early work on corporate entrepreneurship, Sathe (1988) emphasizes
the need to develop managers who possess profound knowledge of relevant areas and
underlines the need for personal external contacts and networks. With regard to the public
sector, Mack, Green, and Vedlitz (2008) ﬁnd public entrepreneurship not only to positively
correlate with the number of local social/service organization memberships and to posi-
tively correlate with a preference for local community but also to negatively correlate with
memberships in local business organizations. Schneider, Teske, and Mintrom (1995) con-
clude that public sector entrepreneurs are motivated by their desire to respond to the local
community’s needs and local politics. They also characterize public sector entrepreneurs as
embedded in social networks. This embeddedness helps them discover opportunities and
ﬁnd support to implement ideas (Schneider, Teske, and Mintrom 1995, 216). Similarly,
Mintrom (2000, 282) identiﬁes the importance of networking for policy entrepreneurs
to succeed. He points out that entrepreneurs can earn stakeholder trust and learn their pref-
erences. Social capital (Coleman 1988), which Floyd andWooldridge (1997) identify as an
important antecedent of organization members to act entrepreneurially, is thus an important
part of localism and the logic behind its inﬂuence on EO. Middle managers can exchange
information with local stakeholders and fulﬁll or facilitate their needs. However, middle
managers will be more likely to do so if they do have the desire to create value for local
communities. These interrelated characteristics are combined in the following hypothesis:




To evaluate our hypotheses, we used department-level aggregated data collected during
a larger research project on PVM at Germany’s FLA. In-depth studies of single
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information with local stakeholders and fulﬁll or facilitate their needs. However, middle
managers will be more likely to do so if they do have the desire to create value for local
communities. These interrelated characteristics are combined in the following hypothesis:
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organizations have repeatedly been called for by corporate entrepreneurship scholars (e.g.,
Zahra, Jennings, and Kuratko 1999, 55; Morris et al. 2006, 488), and the FLA appears
especially suited. Founded in 1927, the FLA employed 113,000 people in 2010. It offers
employment services and coordinates transfer payments. NPM reforms have been intro-
duced in recent years to increase efﬁciency and EO (Meynhardt and Metelmann 2009,
280). The reforms and the FLA’s cultural context (active in a Rechtsstaat; Pollitt and
Bouckaert 2004, 42) have made it a role model for other European countries, such as
France.
The FLA’s organizational structure includes headquarters in Nuremberg as well as 10
regional ofﬁces across Germany. At the local level, 178 agencies (German: Arbeitsagen-
turen; hereafter referred to as departments) perform the operational tasks to fulﬁll the
FLA’s legal mandate. Although strategy is determined centrally, strong regional differen-
ces in the labor market require adaptations, resulting in regional differences in the inter-
pretation and application of central directives. A MbO approach ensures adherence to the
general policies and budget constraints set by the government. At the same time, this ap-
proach provides degrees of freedom to effectively and efﬁciently use resources to comply
with regional conditions (e.g., municipality versus rural areas). This is where the idea of
entrepreneurship comes into play. Bound by the legal mandate and to objectives annually
agreed on by the headquarters, the local agencies are inspired to achieve their results in an
entrepreneurial way.
To ensure comparability among departments, the FLA uses ﬁve strategy groups.
Departments in the same group exhibit similar labor market conditions and are therefore
comparable.1 The departments are directed by three types of middle managers (hereafter
referred to as department managers): local agency heads, local operations heads, and local
internal services heads. Department managers have one of three types of contracts: tradi-
tional lifelong civil servant contracts, civil servant contracts that are temporarily suspended
in order to use other HRmeasures (hereafter, civil servants on leave), and regular employee
contracts.
In short, the FLA setup seems well suited for this single case research. It is a public
sector organization that demands entrepreneurial behavior from its middle management.
All of its 178 departments fulﬁll the same legal mandate, but vary in important aspects,
including EO. Thus, a comparison—as anticipated by Morris et al. (2006, 488)—seems
possible. It should be noted that EO is not equally relevant in all parts of the FLA’s busi-
ness. Kelly, Mulgan, and Muers (2002, 34–5) recognize that value in public sector organ-
izations is created through entrepreneurial behavior in some areas but through adherence to
standards in others. Entrepreneurship is considered important in the fragmented labor mar-
ket, where local characteristics and a fast-changing environment require entrepreneurial
responses. However, this is not true for the FLA’s task of coordinating transfer payments,
which is therefore explicitly excluded from this study.
1 Strategy group I: urban, low unemployment; group II: urban, high unemployment; group III: rural, high
unemployment; group IV: rural, low unemployment; group V: mostly eastern part of Germany, high unemployment
(Dauth, Hirschenauer, and Ru¨b 2008).
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Data Collection and Sample Data
We used online questionnaires to collect data from our key respondents, namely the de-
partment managers, who provided data on the antecedents and our dependent variable de-
partment-level EO. In addition, department-level EO was assessed by the managers’
supervisors, the heads of regional ofﬁces. A number of tactics were applied to increase
key respondent participation, including a personalized announcement letter signed by
a board member, a detailed privacy policy, and a reminder email (Simsek and Veiga
2000, 107–8). Using personalized links, the FLA survey unit enriched the survey data with
demographics.
Of the 347 department managers (including all three types), we successfully contacted
343, of whom 264 participated. Following a conservative approach, we excluded 13 cases
from the analyses due to missing values in the dependent variable EO (Hair et al. 2010, 48)
and 1 case for missing more than 20% of all other variables (following Antoncic and
Hisrich 2001, 56, who use 25% as a cutoff point). For the remaining 250 cases, Little’s
MCAR test indicates data missing completely at random, thus allowing any method to
be used to impute data (Hair et al. 2010, 56–60; Rubin 1976). Using expectation maximi-
zation, we replace 84 values, representing 0.7% of all values used in the subsequent anal-
yses. Using these data, the effective response rate is 73% at the department manager level
(250 of 343) with responses from 85% of the departments. More speciﬁcally, the 250 ques-
tionnaires are from 152 departments, of which 65 provided one, 76 provided two, and 11
provided three questionnaires. The department managers included in the analyses are on
average 50.6 years old, have a 23.3-year organization, 6.3-year department, and 4.3-year
position tenure; most are civil servants (55%), followed by civil servants on leave (22%),
and employees (22%; reported values exclude missing data). We see little reason to assume
nonresponse bias. First, the response rate—73%—is high. Second, no variable in the ﬁnal
model is correlated with the recorded order of survey completion (Armstrong and Overton
1977, 397; Kanuk and Berenson 1975, 449). Third, respondents and nonrespondents only
differ in terms of their department’s size, with no differences in gender, function, region, or
strategy group.
To mitigate the potential for common method bias, we followed a number of proce-
dural techniques (e.g., randomly rotating items within constructs, ensuring anonymity, and
encouraging honest answers) and statistical techniques (Podsakoff et al. 2003, 887;
Churchill 1979, 70). Harman’s single-factor test using unrotated factor analysis resulted
in 24 factors with eigenvalues greater than one. The ﬁrst factor explained less than
15% of the variance in the data and consequently does not indicate a common method bias
(Podsakoff and Organ 1986, 536). In addition, up to three department managers rated their
own department’s EO; in 62 cases (41%), their regional ofﬁce supervisor also rated this
department’s EO using questionnaires with identical wording. To assess the reliability of
our key respondents (department managers), we calculated two-way intraclass correlation
coefﬁcients ICC(C,1) (James 1982). ICC(1) values of .25 are considered large (Cohen
1988, 79–81), indicating that a single rating is likely to provide a reliable rating of the
group mean (Bliese 2000, 356). The average ICC(C,1) between the supervisor ratings
and department-level aggregated self-reports is .46 for all 62 departments. ICC even rea-
ches .80 for supervisors indicating maximum familiarity with a department. We therefore
use department-level aggregated data from our key respondents (department managers)
from here onward.
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Measures
All constructs were measured using multiple items on a six-point Likert-like scale, using
adaptations from existing literature where possible. Since there are few public sector-
speciﬁc scales available, modiﬁcations were made to existing items. For these modiﬁca-
tions and the creation of new items, we followed recommended scale development steps
(e.g., Hinkin 1995). As a result, we created an initial item pool based on construct deﬁ-
nitions, designed scales, and conducted qualitative and quantitative pretests. In the qual-
itative pretesting, we involved 13 FLA experts, 7 academics, and the FLA’s top
management by means of workshops, mail correspondence, as well as personal and tele-
phonic interviews. The questionnaire was then pretested quantitatively on a random sample
of 40 FLA department managers (78% response rate). Additional adjustments were made
and discussed with FLA managers before launching the survey.
Antecedents
We used items from the Corporate Entrepreneurship Assessment Instrument (CEAI;
Hornsby, Kuratko, and Zahra 2002, 254) as a basis to measure management support, work
discretion, rewards/reinforcement, and resource availability. Several aspects of the CEAI
were judged unsuitable during the qualitative pretest in the FLA context for reasons of
content and language. We therefore adapted CEAI items or created new items. To measure
goal ambiguity, items were adapted from existing scales for goal clarity (Pandey and
Garnett 2006, 42; Rainey 1983) and role conﬂict (Rizzo, House, and Lirtzman 1970,
237). No adequate scales could be found for KPI focus and multitude of expectations.
For localism, existing items were adapted (Mack, Green, and Vedlitz 2008, 244) and
new items were created based on deﬁnitions (Roof 1972). Table A1 contains a list of
all items.
Entrepreneurial Orientation
Although, in the private sector, a reliable and valid EO measure has been developed over
the past 30 years, no equivalent measure has been found for the public sector. EO—deﬁned
according to the three dimensions of innovation, proactiveness, and risk-taking—has
mostly been measured by the ENTRESCALE (Covin and Slevin 1989; Miller 1983) or
one of its derivatives. Yet, existing scales are largely inappropriate for the public sector
due to their strong market focus (e.g., ‘‘In dealing with its competitors, my ﬁrm typically
seeks to avoid competitive clashes, preferring a ‘live-and-let-live’ approach’’; Covin and
Slevin 1989, 86). The risk-taking dimension has proven to be the least sector-speciﬁc.
Morris and Jones (1999, 87) argue along the same lines and identify a need to adapt existing
private sector EO measures to public sector particularities. A recent meta-analysis shows
that careful modiﬁcations of Covin and Slevin’s scale did not compromise its validity. The
authors even encourage such adaptations (Rauch et al. 2009, 778–9). As a result, new items
for the innovation and proactiveness dimensions were created and existing items were
adapted for the risk-taking dimension.
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Control Variables
Department characteristics controlled for were number of employees (de Clercq, Dimov,
and Thongpapanl 2010, 95; Zahra, Jennings, and Kuratko 1999, 54) and strategy group
(de Clercq, Dimov, and Thongpapanl 2010, 95 use industry; Hornsby et al. 2009; Zahra,
Jennings, and Kuratko 1999, 54). With regard to the department management team, we in-
cluded type of contract, age, aswell as tenure in current position and current department (one
variable computed as the minimum of the two separate questions about tenure), as well as
tenure in the organization (Hornsby et al. 2009; Hornsby, Kuratko, and Zahra 2002, 263).
To mitigate the problem of nonnormality while ensuring comparability, we used the log of
the size, tenure, and age variables. Categorical variables were dummy coded for the analyses.
Measurement Reliability and Validity
Before conducting our focal analyses, we established unidimensional, reliable, and valid
measures. To do so, we applied exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and conﬁrmatory factor
analyses (CFAs). An EFA (common factor analysis) with orthogonal rotation (varimax)
(Hair et al. 2010, 105–8) was applied to all independent variable items. As shown in
table A2, the results indicate clean loadings for resources, KPI focus, goal ambiguity,
and localism. To ensure unidimensional, reliable, and valid measures for all constructs,
we reﬁned the measurements by means of CFA. As suggested by Hair and colleagues
(2010, 676), we used the following indicators (and generally accepted thresholds) to judge
the ﬁt of our models: x2/associated df (3.00), root mean square error of approximation
(RMSEA) (.08), standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) (.10), comparative ﬁt
index (CFI) (.90), and Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) (.90). After removing insigniﬁcant
items and items with high modiﬁcation indices, the model demonstrated an acceptable
ﬁt. During this process, the constructs management support and work discretion were com-
bined as they could not be differentiated according to the data; furthermore, the measure-
ment for rewards/reinforcement could not be established as its items loaded on more than
one factor. The EO measure was established using the three dimensions risk-taking, inno-
vativeness, and proactiveness as latent variables, applying CFA. After deleting four prob-
lematic items, we accepted the EO measurement model, with all indices achieving optimal
values. We also ran CFA for the entire measurement model, including the independent
variables. The resulting model showed acceptable ﬁt: x2(314, N 5 152) 5 406.43, p 5
.00, x2/df 5 1.29, RMSEA 5 .04, SRMR 5 .06, CFI 5 .95, TLI 5 .94. Table A3 and
ﬁgure A1 contain the model speciﬁcations and ﬁt indices for all models.
We assessed reliability (convergent validity, Fornell and Larcker 1981, 46) at the item
and construct levels. At the item level, all loadings are signiﬁcant at p, .001. At construct
level, all constructs reached the ideal value of..60 for composite reliability (Bagozzi and
Yi 1988, 80): management support/work discretion (0.86), resource availability (0.71), KPI
focus (0.89), goal ambiguity (0.68), multitude of expectations (0.67), localism (0.65),
innovativeness (0.88), proactiveness (0.80), and risk taking (0.81). The average variance
extracted is below the desirable level of ..50 for four constructs, indicating that less var-
iance was explained in these constructs by their measures than not (Fornell and Larcker
1981, 46; Bagozzi and Yi 1988, 80). To prevent jeopardizing content validity, we continue
our analyses with the four constructs resource availability (0.46), goal ambiguity (0.43),
multitude of expectations (0.43), and localism (0.39), acknowledging that the measures are
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focus (0.89), goal ambiguity (0.68), multitude of expectations (0.67), localism (0.65),
innovativeness (0.88), proactiveness (0.80), and risk taking (0.81). The average variance
extracted is below the desirable level of ..50 for four constructs, indicating that less var-
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not perfectly reliable. Discriminant validity was assessed following the procedure sug-
gested by Fornell and Larcker (1981). As required, most constructs’ average variance ex-
tracted (AVE) is larger than the squared correlations (R2) with other constructs. Only
proactiveness’s AVE of .57 is smaller than its R2 with innovativeness (.66). Given that
the two dimensions are combined to represent EO, this marginal violation seems uncritical.
External Validity
There are four elements of empirical evidence that—in our view—strengthen the results’
generalizability within the FLA. The ﬁrst is the combination of a high response rate and
little indication of biases due to nonresponse or missing data (population validity) (Bracht
and Glass 1968, 438).
Second, we do not rely entirely on the middle managers’ self-assessment of EO with
regard to how innovative, proactive, and risk taking their departments are. Instead, we ﬁnd
a high consistency between middle managers’ assessments and their supervisor’s assess-
ment (see the section Data Collection and Sample Data). Supervisors and middle managers
thus basically agree on which departments are entrepreneurial. Furthermore, the partici-
pants also supplied behavioral-level data, that is, the frequency of initiatives launched
in their departments. In deﬁning these initiatives in the questionnaire, we focused on
initiatives that go beyond the usual daily business. Within the statutory mandate, these
initiatives create PV for the district not entirely measurable in numbers and data. Our
dependent variable EO correlates signiﬁcantly with this frequency (r 5 .39, p , .001),
thus indicating that our dependent variable has a positive PV-creating capability.
Third, a number of FLA projects provide observable evidence for FLA middle man-
agers’ possibilities and entrepreneurial activities. One such project is the fair Meer Arbeit,
which specializes in cruise ship crew job placements. The fair was initiated by the FLA
agency in Suhl, an inland city. Today, Meer Arbeit operates a competence center for mar-
itime jobs. Owing to this and other initiatives, Suhl’s unemployment rate is among the
lowest in Eastern Germany (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit 2011; Tietz 2008). Another project
is Bu¨rgerarbeit (civic work), in which unemployed people are provided with community
jobs. The model is currently implemented at a federal level after it was originally tested in
the town of Bad Schmiedeberg (Spiegel Online 2010; Steiner et al. 2008). Both projects
were initiated by middle managers, have required innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk
taking, and have had long-term effects beyond the local context.
Fourth, after the analyses, we discussed our ﬁndings in two workshops (with about 25
survey participants each). The workshop participants conﬁrmed our ﬁndings and interpre-
tations. We therefore hold that there is a good ﬁt between our ﬁndings and the FLA context.
In addition, we conducted one ﬁnal validity test, somewhat independently from the
previous aspects. We determined the correlation between our dependent variable EO and
a desirable organizational outcome relevant to fulﬁlling the legal mandate. In the middle
manager questionnaire, we included items on the departments’ PV orientation (e.g., ‘‘My
department, compared to other departments . . . contributes sustainably to public value’’ and
‘‘. . . creates public value beyond ﬁgures and data within the legal mandate’’). The depart-
ment-level self-reported EO and public value orientation scores are signiﬁcantly correlated
(r 5 .56, p ,.001), thus indicating that EO is not detrimental to the FLA’s legal mandate.
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ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations of all control variables and
composites based on the ﬁnal CFA model. Values for our dependent variable—the EO
score—range from 1.56 to 6.00 with a mean of 4.08, a standard deviation of .66, a mode
of 4.00, and a median of 4.00. Again, these data are from the department level, aggregated
from department managers. We used a hierarchical ordinary least squares regression anal-
ysis with forced entry to test our hypotheses. Inspections of the data do not indicate prob-
lems for our regression results (table 2) in terms of multicollinearity, nonnormality,
heteroscedasticity, nonlinear relationships, outliers, or nonindependent errors.
Model 1 contains control variables for department characteristics. These antecedents
do not signiﬁcantly explain EO variance. In Model 2, we include the control variables re-
lating to the department management team and explain an additional 13% of the variance.
The dummy variables for contract type indicate that departments with more employees
display a higher EO. Moreover, departments with managers that have longer tenure in their
current position in their current department are more entrepreneurially oriented. Model 3
contains all control variables and the antecedents derived from established private sector
literature. The inclusion of these variables signiﬁcantly improves the model, explaining an
additional 7% of EO variance. As expected, management support (H1a), work discretion
(H1b), and resources (H1d) positively and signiﬁcantly impact EO. Model 4 includes the
antecedents derived from NPM/PVM research. This further improves variance explanation
by 14%, resulting in an R2 of 41%. KPI focus is not signiﬁcant (H2a) but only by a small
margin. In fact, KPI focus’s impact is in the opposite direction than originally hypothesized.
Departments with a strong perceived focus on KPIs are more likely to be entrepreneurially
oriented. Goal ambiguity (H2b) is clearly insigniﬁcant. Both antecedents derived from the
PVM literature are signiﬁcant. Consistent with H3a and H3b, a multitude of expectations
and localism positively impact EO. In Model 4, current position/department has the highest
signiﬁcance level, followed by expectations, contract (employee), strategy group (IV), lo-
calism, and resources. Management support/work discretion is no longer signiﬁcant at the
5% level. In short, the selected antecedents help explain much of the departments’ EO;
speciﬁcally, 41% of the variance can be explained. Additional robustness tests at an in-
dividual level and by means of structural equation modeling conﬁrm the results.
In summary, we ﬁnd support for two of the three main hypothesis groups. Owing to the
strong correlations between the items of established private sector antecedents, only a com-
bination of management support, work direction, and resources could be tested. As
expected, these are positively correlated with EO in Model 3, providing some support
for H1a, H1b, and H1d. Yet, in Model 4, management support/work discretion is no longer
signiﬁcant. H1c, suggesting a positive effect of rewards/reinforcement on EO, could not be
tested. H2a and H2b, suggesting negative impacts of KPI focus and goal ambiguity on EO,
could not be conﬁrmed. Finally, we ﬁnd support for H3a and H3b, concerning the positive
effects of multitude of expectations and localism on EO. The strong positive impact of
tenure in position/department on EO is also noteworthy for the following discussion.
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regard to how innovative, proactive, and risk taking their departments are. Instead, we ﬁnd
a high consistency between middle managers’ assessments and their supervisor’s assess-
ment (see the section Data Collection and Sample Data). Supervisors and middle managers
thus basically agree on which departments are entrepreneurial. Furthermore, the partici-
pants also supplied behavioral-level data, that is, the frequency of initiatives launched
in their departments. In deﬁning these initiatives in the questionnaire, we focused on
initiatives that go beyond the usual daily business. Within the statutory mandate, these
initiatives create PV for the district not entirely measurable in numbers and data. Our
dependent variable EO correlates signiﬁcantly with this frequency (r 5 .39, p , .001),
thus indicating that our dependent variable has a positive PV-creating capability.
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which specializes in cruise ship crew job placements. The fair was initiated by the FLA
agency in Suhl, an inland city. Today, Meer Arbeit operates a competence center for mar-
itime jobs. Owing to this and other initiatives, Suhl’s unemployment rate is among the
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jobs. The model is currently implemented at a federal level after it was originally tested in
the town of Bad Schmiedeberg (Spiegel Online 2010; Steiner et al. 2008). Both projects
were initiated by middle managers, have required innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk
taking, and have had long-term effects beyond the local context.
Fourth, after the analyses, we discussed our ﬁndings in two workshops (with about 25
survey participants each). The workshop participants conﬁrmed our ﬁndings and interpre-
tations. We therefore hold that there is a good ﬁt between our ﬁndings and the FLA context.
In addition, we conducted one ﬁnal validity test, somewhat independently from the
previous aspects. We determined the correlation between our dependent variable EO and
a desirable organizational outcome relevant to fulﬁlling the legal mandate. In the middle
manager questionnaire, we included items on the departments’ PV orientation (e.g., ‘‘My
department, compared to other departments . . . contributes sustainably to public value’’ and
‘‘. . . creates public value beyond ﬁgures and data within the legal mandate’’). The depart-
ment-level self-reported EO and public value orientation scores are signiﬁcantly correlated
(r 5 .56, p ,.001), thus indicating that EO is not detrimental to the FLA’s legal mandate.
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score—range from 1.56 to 6.00 with a mean of 4.08, a standard deviation of .66, a mode
of 4.00, and a median of 4.00. Again, these data are from the department level, aggregated
from department managers. We used a hierarchical ordinary least squares regression anal-
ysis with forced entry to test our hypotheses. Inspections of the data do not indicate prob-
lems for our regression results (table 2) in terms of multicollinearity, nonnormality,
heteroscedasticity, nonlinear relationships, outliers, or nonindependent errors.
Model 1 contains control variables for department characteristics. These antecedents
do not signiﬁcantly explain EO variance. In Model 2, we include the control variables re-
lating to the department management team and explain an additional 13% of the variance.
The dummy variables for contract type indicate that departments with more employees
display a higher EO. Moreover, departments with managers that have longer tenure in their
current position in their current department are more entrepreneurially oriented. Model 3
contains all control variables and the antecedents derived from established private sector
literature. The inclusion of these variables signiﬁcantly improves the model, explaining an
additional 7% of EO variance. As expected, management support (H1a), work discretion
(H1b), and resources (H1d) positively and signiﬁcantly impact EO. Model 4 includes the
antecedents derived from NPM/PVM research. This further improves variance explanation
by 14%, resulting in an R2 of 41%. KPI focus is not signiﬁcant (H2a) but only by a small
margin. In fact, KPI focus’s impact is in the opposite direction than originally hypothesized.
Departments with a strong perceived focus on KPIs are more likely to be entrepreneurially
oriented. Goal ambiguity (H2b) is clearly insigniﬁcant. Both antecedents derived from the
PVM literature are signiﬁcant. Consistent with H3a and H3b, a multitude of expectations
and localism positively impact EO. In Model 4, current position/department has the highest
signiﬁcance level, followed by expectations, contract (employee), strategy group (IV), lo-
calism, and resources. Management support/work discretion is no longer signiﬁcant at the
5% level. In short, the selected antecedents help explain much of the departments’ EO;
speciﬁcally, 41% of the variance can be explained. Additional robustness tests at an in-
dividual level and by means of structural equation modeling conﬁrm the results.
In summary, we ﬁnd support for two of the three main hypothesis groups. Owing to the
strong correlations between the items of established private sector antecedents, only a com-
bination of management support, work direction, and resources could be tested. As
expected, these are positively correlated with EO in Model 3, providing some support
for H1a, H1b, and H1d. Yet, in Model 4, management support/work discretion is no longer
signiﬁcant. H1c, suggesting a positive effect of rewards/reinforcement on EO, could not be
tested. H2a and H2b, suggesting negative impacts of KPI focus and goal ambiguity on EO,
could not be conﬁrmed. Finally, we ﬁnd support for H3a and H3b, concerning the positive
effects of multitude of expectations and localism on EO. The strong positive impact of
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Benefiting from Different Lenses
Early in this article, we described how public organizations were affected by the introduc-
tion of private sector management principles and that public sector organizations are
expected to become more entrepreneurially oriented. A review of literature suggested or-
ganizational antecedents established in the private sector could foster public sector EO.
Also within the public management discourse, the notion of entrepreneurship has been dis-
cussed extensively. The discussion of NPM and PVM in particular raised questions as to
whether additional antecedents play key roles in fostering EO in public sector organiza-
tions. Adapting private sector antecedents and adding public sector-speciﬁc antecedents
has proven empirically beneﬁcial. In our sample of 250 managers from 152 departments
(agencies) of Germany’s FLA, we ﬁnd not only some support for the importance of estab-
lished organizational antecedents but also for two antecedents associated with PVM (mul-
titude of expectations and localism). These ﬁndings have important implications for both
private and public sector scholars.
First of all, we see that no one normative concept (neither NPM nor PVM) can provide
sufﬁcient answers. As we are aware that much public management discourse is shaped by
doctrine-based assumptions about public sector institutions’ mission and performance, we
Table 2
Results of OLS Analysis with Entrepreneurial Orientation as Dependent Variable
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(Constant) 3.50*** (.65) .75 (1.92) 2.02 (1.8) 22.65 (1.82)
Department size (log) .22 (.25) .16 (.24) .14 (.23) .34 (.23)
Strategy group IIa 2.17 (.20) 2.07 (.19) 2.04 (.18) .01 (.17)
Strategy group IIIa 2.03 (.17) 2.02 (.16) 2.06 (.16) .03 (.15)
Strategy group IVa .35* (.17) .34* (.16) .34* (.16) .41** (.15)
Strategy group Va 2.08 (.17) 2.08 (.17) 2.06 (.16) .05 (.15)
Employeea .44 (.18) .49 (.17) .46 (.16)
Civil servant on leavea .11* (.16) .13** (.16) .22** (.15)
Position/departmental tenure (log) .92*** (.25) .99*** (.25) .84*** (.24)
Organization tenure (log) 2.01 (.41) .08 (.39) .01 (.36)
Age (log) 1.32 (1.24) 1.17 (1.21) 1.03 (1.12)
Support/discretion .13* (.07) .12 (.06)
Resources .14* (.07) .12* (.06)
KPI focus .14 (.07)
Goal ambiguity .01 (.06)
Expectations .22** (.07)
Localism .19* (.08)
R2 .07 .20 .27 .41
Adjusted R2 .04 .14 .20 .34
F 2.20 3.52*** 4.22*** 5.77***
R2 change .07 .13 .07 .14
F change 2.20 4.57*** 6.37** 7.91***
Note. Unstandardized coefﬁcients are given, with SEs in parentheses. N 5 152.
aCoded as dummy variable.
*p , .05; **p , .01; ***p , .001.
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lished organizational antecedents but also for two antecedents associated with PVM (mul-
titude of expectations and localism). These ﬁndings have important implications for both
private and public sector scholars.
First of all, we see that no one normative concept (neither NPM nor PVM) can provide
sufﬁcient answers. As we are aware that much public management discourse is shaped by
doctrine-based assumptions about public sector institutions’ mission and performance, we
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believe that our insights into the mechanisms at work can only be advanced by taking mul-
tiple rationalities into account.
The results of our ﬁrst set of hypotheses indicate that a conscious transfer of concepts
from the private sector to the public sector is worthwhile and helps further our understand-
ing of the phenomenon under study. With regard to corporate entrepreneurship, our re-
search contributes by validating organizational antecedents in a different context,
especially in middle management. There have been explicit calls for the assessment of
corporate entrepreneurship outside the private sector (Phan et al. 2009, 204). We provide
initial evidence, consistent with private sector research (Hornsby, Kuratko, and Zahra
2002; Hornsby et al. 2009; Kuratko et al. 2005), that management support (H1a), work
discretion (H1b), and resource availability (H1d) positively inﬂuence department-level
EO in the public sector as well. When overlooking other antecedents included in this study,
these antecedents have signiﬁcant positive effects, despite the fact that our data derives
from one organization. This underpins Marginson’s (2002) observation of the importance
of perception, rather than just the manifest structure or organizational design. Nevertheless,
the effect of these antecedents is limited and diminishes slightly when considering addi-
tional antecedents. However, the results lead us to speculate about sector-independent ante-
cedents. It comes as no surprise that a supportive culture—which offers support in difﬁcult
situations instead of blaming—pays off in terms of EO, as does some control over resources
and leeway. In other words, our results may foster discussions about general human ten-
dencies with regard to what has been labeled EO in existing organizations. In fact, Bozeman
and Kingsley (1998) provide empirical evidence that the organization’s sector can hardly
explain the variance between organizations’ risk cultures. Risk culture was rather
accounted for by factors, such as top managers’ willingness to trust employees.
The results of our second set of hypotheses weigh against undifferentiated NPM crit-
icism. Scholars and practitioners have claimed that a strong focus on clear, quantiﬁable
goals could negatively affect a public sector organization’s performance. Within our con-
text, we ﬁnd no evidence for such claims with regard to EO. Since the entrepreneurial
aspect of the public manager’s task is only one aspect of his or her duties besides managing
routine work, our data can only be interpreted in this speciﬁc realm: KPI focus (H2a) does
not have a negative effect on EO; in fact, it has a (nonsigniﬁcant) positive effect. This
ﬁnding is consistent with Marginson (2002, 1026), who ﬁnds no discouraging effect of
KPI use on the development of initiatives and new ideas. Whether or not middle managers
(here, department managers) act entrepreneurially is thus neither hindered nor substantially
fostered by a strong KPI focus. At least in the FLA, a concern about ﬁgures does not impede
a sense of EO inmiddle managers. Given our study design, we cannot exclude a more subtle
relationship. For example, the KPI focus for all manager task aspects may indirectly
support entrepreneurship since it ensures sufﬁcient performance in the core areas prior
to starting new initiatives. In sum, our results can be interpreted as a plea for a differentiated
criticism of performance management’s NPM-based practices.
The second antecedent tested in this context, goal ambiguity (H2b), does not have any
effect on EO in our overall sample. One explanation could be that managers react to goal
ambiguity in different ways, as anticipated by Ramamurti (1986). Entrepreneurial man-
agers can deal with the associated uncertainty, whereas others might be hindered from tak-
ing on a more strategic, that is, entrepreneurial role (Currie and Procter 2005). It should
once more be noted that both antecedents were measured within one organization with
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a fairly similar overall structure, thus possibly providing limited variance. Yet, another
explanation, underpinned by the observed variance in the constructs (table 1), appears more
appropriate: the organizational antecedents have limited explanatory power. This is very
much in line with the ﬁndings of Meynhardt and Metelmann (2009), who note that the
organizational setting is not a primary source of role conﬂict in the FLA.
The results of our third set of hypotheses support scholars promoting PVM. An active
involvement in the immediate local environment seems to foster EO. Multitude of expect-
ations (H3a) has a strong effect on managerial action and fosters EO, as anticipated by
Meynhardt and Metelmann (2009). Local community needs and key stakeholders play
an important role in deﬁning and achieving public sector entrepreneurial opportunities.
This relates to the support we ﬁnd for H3b: EO is positively affected by middle manage-
ment localism, that is, their willingness and desire to fulﬁll local community needs. Public
middle managers span boundaries between internal and external expectations and thereby
contribute to the ever-developing relationship between an organization and its environ-
ment. Consequently, critics of public entrepreneurship could question their self-interest
and motivation (see Rhodes andWanna 2007). Further studies might also explore the extent
to which the motivation to belong to a certain status group in a certain environment (e.g.,
social identity and reputation) qualiﬁes as an antecedent of sensitivity to perceive a mul-
titude of expectations, willingness to relate to the local context, and the desire to stay in
a role for a longer period of time (position tenure).
The most important determinant of department-level EO in our study is tenure in cur-
rent position/department. Interpretation of this tenure type appears most fruitful together
with multitude of expectations and localism. Such a local involvement should help man-
agers gain access to relevant partners and spot entrepreneurial opportunities. Building net-
works outside the organization and/or within the department (Floyd and Wooldridge 1999,
133) appears more relevant than within the rest of the organization: organizational tenure
does not signiﬁcantly affect EO. Although the importance of embeddedness and social net-
works for corporate entrepreneurship (e.g., Floyd andWooldridge 1999; Simsek, Lubatkin,
and Floyd 2003) has been emphasized, there is little empirical research on the interplay
between tenure, embeddedness, and EO in the private sector. Together, all three sets of
hypotheses help achieve a better understanding of the EO phenomenon. Interestingly,
stimuli external to the organization are of special importance.
Toward an Understanding of Social Context
Compared to the other antecedents, the special importance of factors external to the orga-
nization was not obvious beforehand. One can argue that ideas of PVM have helped with
reconsidering the role of environmental contingencies for EO. As our study shows, entre-
preneurship in the FLA is directed toward PV, but even from a PVM viewpoint, the ex-
planatory power of EO’s social context cannot be taken for granted. Therefore, we
encourage more research into how drivers external to a public organization complement
the internal ones.
In order to solve this puzzle, we take up the abovementioned call by Kelman to better
‘‘connect to the broader world of mainstream organization theory’’ (2005, 967). An attrac-
tive candidate for introducing such an outside-in perspective to public entrepreneurship is
the discourse on institutional entrepreneurship, which looks beyond available resources and
efﬁciency concerns (Bruton, Ahlstrom, and Li 2010). We follow the basic concept of
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believe that our insights into the mechanisms at work can only be advanced by taking mul-
tiple rationalities into account.
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discretion (H1b), and resource availability (H1d) positively inﬂuence department-level
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of perception, rather than just the manifest structure or organizational design. Nevertheless,
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KPI use on the development of initiatives and new ideas. Whether or not middle managers
(here, department managers) act entrepreneurially is thus neither hindered nor substantially
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a fairly similar overall structure, thus possibly providing limited variance. Yet, another
explanation, underpinned by the observed variance in the constructs (table 1), appears more
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social identity and reputation) qualiﬁes as an antecedent of sensitivity to perceive a mul-
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Compared to the other antecedents, the special importance of factors external to the orga-
nization was not obvious beforehand. One can argue that ideas of PVM have helped with
reconsidering the role of environmental contingencies for EO. As our study shows, entre-
preneurship in the FLA is directed toward PV, but even from a PVM viewpoint, the ex-
planatory power of EO’s social context cannot be taken for granted. Therefore, we
encourage more research into how drivers external to a public organization complement
the internal ones.
In order to solve this puzzle, we take up the abovementioned call by Kelman to better
‘‘connect to the broader world of mainstream organization theory’’ (2005, 967). An attrac-
tive candidate for introducing such an outside-in perspective to public entrepreneurship is
the discourse on institutional entrepreneurship, which looks beyond available resources and
efﬁciency concerns (Bruton, Ahlstrom, and Li 2010). We follow the basic concept of
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DiMaggio, who argues that institutional entrepreneurship is about the creation of ‘‘a whole
new system of meaning that ties the functioning of disparate sets of institutions together’’
(1988, 14). The term ‘‘institution’’ refers to values, rules, and norms, which create a context
of expectations for individual and collective action. Consequently, a public organization’s
inﬂuence on such institutions can be seen as PV creation (or destruction) (Meynhardt 2009).
Through its effects, public institutional entrepreneurship may lead to new organizational
settings as well as initiatives to develop new services and interaction patterns that are op-
erated by a number of constituencies, rather than solely by the administration. Such a PVM
does not imply an expansion of the state but a conscious effort to facilitate and improve the
achievement of a legal mandate. In this sense, public entrepreneurship, which is directed at
increasing PV, does not face a legitimacy issue per se. However, where political legitimi-
zation starts and ends is a matter of degree.
For middle managers in the FLA, public institutional entrepreneurship is about spot-
ting labor market-oriented needs in their district and turning them into institutional oppor-
tunities. In this view, engaged public sector managers strive—within a given legal
mandate—for new institutional services and add value for the public by realizing them.
In respect of middle managers’ role in the public sector, we hold that entrepreneurial be-
havior becomes institutional when it begins to recognize opportunities in the social context.
Empirical evidence now encourages also seeing EO in the public sector from an
institutional entrepreneurship viewpoint, which emphasizes context variables, such as cul-
ture, regulatory structures, as well as cognitive factors as important determinants of entre-
preneurship (Bruton, Ahlstrom, and Li 2010). Research is needed on institutional settings
that enable and constrain public entrepreneurship. When does an administration become
entrepreneurial? And does this take place to ﬁll structural gaps or is it triggered by external
shocks? Research on how the subject position of certain actors comes into play, that is, to
what extent institutional entrepreneurs can bridge diverse stakeholders or require a certain
legitimacy provided by their social status (Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence 2004). The
enabling role of individuals’ social position (Battilana 2006) may therefore be yet another
area to deepen our understanding of EO. A third possible research area may be the
discursive and political practices developed by entrepreneurs to effectively leverage their
agency (Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence 2004; Reay, Golden-Biddle, and Germann 2006).
Along these lines, we can empirically ground the way in which institutional change is
promoted at individual actors’ micro level by harnessing opportunities in the local envi-
ronment.
We believe this institutional perspective provides us with a number of interesting re-
search questions. Nonetheless, the linkages between institutional theory and entrepreneur-
ship are complex (Bruton, Ahlstrom, and Li 2010) and ‘‘low hanging fruits’’ should not be
expected. Nevertheless, our study might pave the way for providing public management
research with new institutional variables. In effect, this more mainstream organizational
theory discourse lens may also help dissolve the battleﬁeld of normative arguments asso-
ciated with NPM and PVM.
Practical Implications
Our ﬁndings might also have important practical implications, especially for top manage-
ment and HR policies. Most importantly, the data indicate that middle managers should not
be forced to rotate positions too frequently. They need time and should be encouraged to
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build local networks that provide them with access to a ‘‘multitude of expectations.’’ De-
veloping an understanding of and caring about local circumstances also promotes EO. An-
other key insight from our study is the importance of fostering active network engagement
as a new practice relevant for MCS. As a matter of interest, based on our study, the FLA has
introduced managerial performance indicators to integrate localism into the KPI system.
Finally, it is crucial for top management to ensure organizational support whenever pos-
sible, especially in the form of resources for the implementation of new ideas.
Limitations
Despite these contributions, this study still has some limitations, which mostly relate to
internal and external validity (Bryman 2008, 694; Cook and Campbell 1976, 226). Con-
cerning internal validity, measurements, data, and analytical procedures imply potential
limitations. First, the way in which the constructs were measured may be imperfect.
Although all measures used multiple items, were inspired by existing research, and were
extensively tested, none of the measures could be employed without adjustments. This
potentially imperfect operationalization resulted in the exclusion (rewards/recognition)
or modiﬁcation (management support and expectations) of constructs. Furthermore, this
study’s results may still be affected by common method bias (Podsakoff et al. 2003). How-
ever, the consistency in EO ratings from multiple sources indicates limited concern. Yet,
all main analyses are based on self-reports and can potentially include biased (e.g., socially
expected) answers. To overcome such potential biases, future research might seek to
use different measures and to obtain data on dependent and independent variables from
different sources.
Second, the nature of data collected limits the type of conclusions and the methods of
analysis. The use of cross-sectional data requires caution when drawing causal inferences.
The relationships identiﬁed in this study may be affected by an exogenous variable not
included in this analysis or be prone to reverse causality (Backhaus et al. 2008,
11.1.2.1). Although the hypotheses are based on theoretical considerations, mechanisms
other than the assumed ones could underlie the identiﬁed relationships. Data reﬂecting de-
velopments over time could help overcome such uncertainty. In addition, a larger sample
size would allow for the application of a wider range of analytical tools, such as weighted
least squares estimation in the CFA.
Third, this study did not analyze the effects of mediation, moderation, or interaction
among many of the constructs (Lumpkin and Dess 1996, 156; Venkatraman 1989). One
important avenue of research is therefore to better understand the interplay between the
constructs identiﬁed as most relevant in this research: position/department tenure, localism,
multitude of expectations, and EO.
When evaluating this study’s external validity, it seems helpful to distinguish between
the generalizability of its results to FLA middle management and outside the organization.
We have addressed results generalizability to the FLA in the section on external validity
and have identiﬁed reasons for limited concern in this regard. However, although our ﬁnd-
ings are at least partly in line with prior research, and culture has had a limited inﬂuence in
the study of EO (Rauch et al. 2009, 779), further studies are needed to assess the ﬁndings’
generalizability to other organizations and cultural settings. Such studies could address
similar contexts, where our results may bemost relevant, such as in other labormarket-related
public organizations or other public organizations operating in a Rechtsstaat culture (Pollitt
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(1988, 14). The term ‘‘institution’’ refers to values, rules, and norms, which create a context
of expectations for individual and collective action. Consequently, a public organization’s
inﬂuence on such institutions can be seen as PV creation (or destruction) (Meynhardt 2009).
Through its effects, public institutional entrepreneurship may lead to new organizational
settings as well as initiatives to develop new services and interaction patterns that are op-
erated by a number of constituencies, rather than solely by the administration. Such a PVM
does not imply an expansion of the state but a conscious effort to facilitate and improve the
achievement of a legal mandate. In this sense, public entrepreneurship, which is directed at
increasing PV, does not face a legitimacy issue per se. However, where political legitimi-
zation starts and ends is a matter of degree.
For middle managers in the FLA, public institutional entrepreneurship is about spot-
ting labor market-oriented needs in their district and turning them into institutional oppor-
tunities. In this view, engaged public sector managers strive—within a given legal
mandate—for new institutional services and add value for the public by realizing them.
In respect of middle managers’ role in the public sector, we hold that entrepreneurial be-
havior becomes institutional when it begins to recognize opportunities in the social context.
Empirical evidence now encourages also seeing EO in the public sector from an
institutional entrepreneurship viewpoint, which emphasizes context variables, such as cul-
ture, regulatory structures, as well as cognitive factors as important determinants of entre-
preneurship (Bruton, Ahlstrom, and Li 2010). Research is needed on institutional settings
that enable and constrain public entrepreneurship. When does an administration become
entrepreneurial? And does this take place to ﬁll structural gaps or is it triggered by external
shocks? Research on how the subject position of certain actors comes into play, that is, to
what extent institutional entrepreneurs can bridge diverse stakeholders or require a certain
legitimacy provided by their social status (Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence 2004). The
enabling role of individuals’ social position (Battilana 2006) may therefore be yet another
area to deepen our understanding of EO. A third possible research area may be the
discursive and political practices developed by entrepreneurs to effectively leverage their
agency (Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence 2004; Reay, Golden-Biddle, and Germann 2006).
Along these lines, we can empirically ground the way in which institutional change is
promoted at individual actors’ micro level by harnessing opportunities in the local envi-
ronment.
We believe this institutional perspective provides us with a number of interesting re-
search questions. Nonetheless, the linkages between institutional theory and entrepreneur-
ship are complex (Bruton, Ahlstrom, and Li 2010) and ‘‘low hanging fruits’’ should not be
expected. Nevertheless, our study might pave the way for providing public management
research with new institutional variables. In effect, this more mainstream organizational
theory discourse lens may also help dissolve the battleﬁeld of normative arguments asso-
ciated with NPM and PVM.
Practical Implications
Our ﬁndings might also have important practical implications, especially for top manage-
ment and HR policies. Most importantly, the data indicate that middle managers should not
be forced to rotate positions too frequently. They need time and should be encouraged to
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build local networks that provide them with access to a ‘‘multitude of expectations.’’ De-
veloping an understanding of and caring about local circumstances also promotes EO. An-
other key insight from our study is the importance of fostering active network engagement
as a new practice relevant for MCS. As a matter of interest, based on our study, the FLA has
introduced managerial performance indicators to integrate localism into the KPI system.
Finally, it is crucial for top management to ensure organizational support whenever pos-
sible, especially in the form of resources for the implementation of new ideas.
Limitations
Despite these contributions, this study still has some limitations, which mostly relate to
internal and external validity (Bryman 2008, 694; Cook and Campbell 1976, 226). Con-
cerning internal validity, measurements, data, and analytical procedures imply potential
limitations. First, the way in which the constructs were measured may be imperfect.
Although all measures used multiple items, were inspired by existing research, and were
extensively tested, none of the measures could be employed without adjustments. This
potentially imperfect operationalization resulted in the exclusion (rewards/recognition)
or modiﬁcation (management support and expectations) of constructs. Furthermore, this
study’s results may still be affected by common method bias (Podsakoff et al. 2003). How-
ever, the consistency in EO ratings from multiple sources indicates limited concern. Yet,
all main analyses are based on self-reports and can potentially include biased (e.g., socially
expected) answers. To overcome such potential biases, future research might seek to
use different measures and to obtain data on dependent and independent variables from
different sources.
Second, the nature of data collected limits the type of conclusions and the methods of
analysis. The use of cross-sectional data requires caution when drawing causal inferences.
The relationships identiﬁed in this study may be affected by an exogenous variable not
included in this analysis or be prone to reverse causality (Backhaus et al. 2008,
11.1.2.1). Although the hypotheses are based on theoretical considerations, mechanisms
other than the assumed ones could underlie the identiﬁed relationships. Data reﬂecting de-
velopments over time could help overcome such uncertainty. In addition, a larger sample
size would allow for the application of a wider range of analytical tools, such as weighted
least squares estimation in the CFA.
Third, this study did not analyze the effects of mediation, moderation, or interaction
among many of the constructs (Lumpkin and Dess 1996, 156; Venkatraman 1989). One
important avenue of research is therefore to better understand the interplay between the
constructs identiﬁed as most relevant in this research: position/department tenure, localism,
multitude of expectations, and EO.
When evaluating this study’s external validity, it seems helpful to distinguish between
the generalizability of its results to FLA middle management and outside the organization.
We have addressed results generalizability to the FLA in the section on external validity
and have identiﬁed reasons for limited concern in this regard. However, although our ﬁnd-
ings are at least partly in line with prior research, and culture has had a limited inﬂuence in
the study of EO (Rauch et al. 2009, 779), further studies are needed to assess the ﬁndings’
generalizability to other organizations and cultural settings. Such studies could address
similar contexts, where our results may bemost relevant, such as in other labormarket-related
public organizations or other public organizations operating in a Rechtsstaat culture (Pollitt
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and Bouckaert 2004, 52–3). Furthermore, studies in more dissimilar settings would
strengthen this study’s arguments.
Despite all methodological challenges facing this study’s generalizability, we hold
that, with its speciﬁc conditions, the FLA can be regarded as an exemplary public entre-
preneurship case, with the contribution lying in the generalization of theory and not nec-
essarily of other cases (Yin 1984, 39).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this study provides initial insights into what determines department-level EO
in public sector organizations. Although further work is required to strengthen the ﬁndings,
they conﬁrm established private sector corporate entrepreneurship research on organiza-
tional antecedents and support PVM ideas. At the same time, the ﬁndings contradict NPM
critics who assert negative effects of KPI focus and goal ambiguity on middle management
entrepreneurial behavior. Our results at least differentiate and qualify this general assertion.
As we integrated hypotheses based on ideas from the private sector, the NPM movement,
and the emerging PVM perspective, we distilled antecedents that are at the heart of public
sector entrepreneurship and are in part similar to the private sector and in part unique to the
public sector. To consider ‘‘what is’’ rather than ‘‘what should be’’ may help us develop an
appreciative and evidence-based notion of the nature of entrepreneurship in public admin-
istration. Given the tremendous challenges faced by the public sector, it is much needed.
Table A1
Scale Items
Intended construct Item Content
Work discretion Discr_1 My regional ofﬁce . . . rarely restricts leeway at agency level.
Discr_2
My regional ofﬁce . . . responds constructively to the agency’s
mistakes.
Discr_3 My regional ofﬁce . . . promotes the agencies’ local responsibility.
Management support Suppo_1 My regional ofﬁce . . . is receptive to my ideas and suggestions.
Suppo_2 My regional ofﬁce . . . provides backing, even in difﬁcult situations.
Suppo_3 My regional ofﬁce . . . supports the agencies by removing obstacles.
Rewards/recognition Rewar_1 My regional ofﬁce . . . acknowledges my performance.
Rewar_2
My regional ofﬁce . . . discusses my performance with me beyond
LEDi [the regular obligatory performance evaluation].
Rewar_3
My regional ofﬁce . . . facilitates professional development based
on performance.
Resources Resou_1 I have enough time to develop longer-term business strategies.
Resou_2 I can allocate funds ﬂexibly within my budget.
Resou_3 I have enough staff to quickly implement creative ideas.
KPI focus KPI_f_1 My regional ofﬁce . . . intensively follows up on KPIs.
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KPI_f_2
My regional ofﬁce . . . assesses performance primarily on the basis
of KPIs.
KPI_f_3 My regional ofﬁce . . . manages mainly by means of KPIs.
KPI_f_4 My regional ofﬁce . . . places heavy emphasis on KPIs.
KPI_f_5
My regional ofﬁce . . . only places emphasis on activities directly
affecting KPIs.
Goal ambiguity Goals_1
The prescribed/agreed business objectives . . . are extremely
numerous.
Goals_2
The prescribed/agreed business objectives . . . are contradictory in
some aspects.
Goals_3
The prescribed/agreed business objectives . . . are extremely
complex overall.
Expectations Expec_1
Local actors in the labor market (employers’ associations, unions,
politics, etc.). In my district, . . . the local actors’ expectations of the
agency are very diverse.
Expec_2
In my district, . . . the local actors’ expectations on the agency are
high.
Expec_3
In my district, . . . the expectations of several local actors are
contradictory in some aspects.
Expec_4
In my district, . . . local actors inﬂuence many decisions at the
agency level.
Expec_5
In my district, . . . I frequently receive proposals from the local
environment.
Expec_6
The management committee frequently expresses speciﬁc
expectations.
Localism Local_1 Personally, I really feel at home in my district.
Local_2
How many organizations operating in your district do you work for
voluntarily?
Local_3
In fulﬁlling my task, it is personally especially important to me . . .
to satisfy local needs in the district.
Local_4
In fulﬁlling my task, it is personally especially important to me . . .
to act as a competent partner in the network of local actors.
EO dimensions My agency in its entirety. . .
Innovativeness Innov_1 is open to innovations.
Innov_2 is creative.
Innov_3 is innovative.
Innov_4 often implements new approaches to meet its responsibilities.
Proactiveness Proac_1 rarely behaves hesitantly. (Reverse)
Proac_2 responds to [labor/training] market changes as they occur.
Proac_3 responds mostly actively to [labor/training] market changes.
Proac_4 often approaches external groups to initiate projects.
Risk taking Risk_1 also implements promising but risky projects.
Risk_2
also implements projects with no direct effect on the target
system’s KPIs.
Risk_3 often gets involved, even if the outcome is initially uncertain.
Risk_4 often enters ventures to promote particularly promising projects.
Risk_5 is especially careful in its course of action. (Reverse)
Note. Boldface indicates items included in regression analysis.
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essarily of other cases (Yin 1984, 39).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this study provides initial insights into what determines department-level EO
in public sector organizations. Although further work is required to strengthen the ﬁndings,
they conﬁrm established private sector corporate entrepreneurship research on organiza-
tional antecedents and support PVM ideas. At the same time, the ﬁndings contradict NPM
critics who assert negative effects of KPI focus and goal ambiguity on middle management
entrepreneurial behavior. Our results at least differentiate and qualify this general assertion.
As we integrated hypotheses based on ideas from the private sector, the NPM movement,
and the emerging PVM perspective, we distilled antecedents that are at the heart of public
sector entrepreneurship and are in part similar to the private sector and in part unique to the
public sector. To consider ‘‘what is’’ rather than ‘‘what should be’’ may help us develop an
appreciative and evidence-based notion of the nature of entrepreneurship in public admin-
istration. Given the tremendous challenges faced by the public sector, it is much needed.
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Discr_3 My regional ofﬁce . . . promotes the agencies’ local responsibility.
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on performance.
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In fulﬁlling my task, it is personally especially important to me . . .
to satisfy local needs in the district.
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Table A2
Results of Exploratory Factor Analysis
Intended construct Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Work discretion Discr_1 .68
Work discretion Discr_2 .73
Work discretion Discr_3 .81
Management support Suppo_1 .73
Management support Suppo_2 .79
Management support Suppo_3 .73 .30
Rewards/Recognition Rewar_1 .46 .79
Rewards/Recognition Rewar_2 .43 .58




KPI focus KPI_f_1 .72
KPI focus KPI_f_2 .82
KPI focus KPI_f_3 .83
KPI focus KPI_f_4 .85
KPI focus KPI_f_5 2.34 .63
Goal ambiguity Goals_1 .81
Goal ambiguity Goals_2 .46
Goal ambiguity Goals_3 .61
Expectations Expec_1 .83








Localism Local_4 .34 .44
Note. Principal axis factoring with varimax rotation and Kaiser normalization. N5 152. Boldface indicates items included in regression
analysis. Not displaying loadings , .30.
Table A3
Fit Indices Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Measurement model x2 df x2/df RMSEA SRMR CFI TLI
Independent variables: Initial 637 377 1.69 .07 .07 .87 .85
Independent variables: Trimmed 180 137 1.31 .05 .06 .95 .94
Dependent variables: Initial 117 62 1.89 .08 .06 .95 .93
Dependent variables: Trimmed 38 24 1.58 .06 .04 .98 .97
Complete measurement model 406 314 1.29 .04 .06 .95 .94
Note. Analysis conducted in analysis of moment structures using maximum likelihood estimation. N 5 152.
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